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Green Law-Making: A Primer on the
European Community's Environmental
Legislative Process
Michael Scott Feeley*
Peter M. Gilhuly**
ABSTRACT

The birth of the European Common Market marks a new era of multistate environmental regulation that will radically affect commercial activity. This Article examines the European Community's (EC) background,
institutions, and legislative process to elucidate how this environmental
regime is developing. Following a brief introduction, Part II sets forth
the EC's background, presenting its history and the generalframework
in which its law applies. Part III describes the EC's major institutions.
PartIV discussesforms of EC legislation, with an emphasis on the use of
directives. Part V considers legislative processes by which the EC enacts
laws, including the new cooperative procedure.Part VI discusses the historic and future bases for EC environmental law. Finally, Part VII considers outside parties' roles in the legislative process and the ways in
which private parties can present their views and influence legislative
outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION

As the twenty-first century rapidly approaches, economic affairs are
becoming increasingly globalized. Capital markets are interconnected,
and capital flow no longer recognizes international borders. Many businesses manufacture, buy, and sell products and assets in numerous
nations.
As industry becomes globalized, United States companies find themselves conducting an increasing amount of business in foreign states. The
legal and cultural backgrounds they encounter differ profoundly from
those of the United States. Nowhere is an understanding of these legal
and cultural differences more important to these companies than in the
European Community (EC or the Community).' The EC contains 342
million consumers, compared to the 247 million in the United States and
the 122 million in Japan." These consumers drive the largest market in
the world-approximately four trillion dollars-and the EC constitutes
the largest trading partner of the United States.' As the target date in
1992 for complete integration of the EC's common market approaches,
corporations and other parties doing business with the EC now realize
the importance of understanding the EC institutions, the policies being
implemented, and the means by which these policies might be influenced

1. The European Community is variously referred to as the European Economic
Community (EEC), the European Communities, and the Common Market.
2. JAMES N. GARDNER, EFFECTIVE LOBBYING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Xvi
(1991).
3. See Eleanor R. Lewis & Mark A. Goldstein, The Effect of EC 1992 On U.S.
Companies: A U.S. Government Perspective, 3 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 153, 163,

177 (1989) (United States company sales now exceed $550 billion).
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effectively by outside parties.
A growing global "greening," or environmental awareness, 4 is occur-

ring concurrently with the global economy's development and the EC's
1992 program. Large scale international economic activity increasingly
creates potential risks to the environment and, therefore, to public health
and safety.
This Article examines the EC's background, institutions, and legislative process with a focus on environmental law. Part II sets forth the
EC's background, presenting its history and the general framework in
which its law applies. Part III describes the EC's major institutions.
Part IV discusses the forms of EC legislation, especially the use of directives. Part V considers the processes by which the EC legislates, including the new cooperative procedure. Part VI discusses the bases for EC
environmental law, specifically examining at its history and the individual concerns in this area. Finally, Part VII considers outside parties' role
in the legislative process, and the ways in which private parties can present their views and influence the legislative outcome.
II.

BACKGROUND OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

The European Community is a supranational, treaty-based organization5 that represents twelve Member States.' The EC's 1992 Project is

4. See Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalizationof Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421, 425-26 (1989).
5. The European Community is actually three communities, which operate under
three separate treaties: the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY

COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY]; and the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY]. See EEG Treaty art. 232. Although
each treaty represented a separate, autonomous grouping of states for a particular eco-

nomic purpose, the EEC Treaty is by far the most important because it provides for the
establishment of a general common market and the establishment of several common
institutions. The major institutions of the EC created by the EEC Treaty are the Council
of Ministers, the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of

Justice. EEC TREATY art. 4.
The memberships of these three treaty groups overlap. The adoption of the Merger
Treaty in 1965, however, effectively combined the three separate communities created by
these treaties. JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAW 3 (1988). Today, the
EEC Treaty, which governs Community affairs generally and environmental policy specifically, is the most important treaty. Thomas H. Reynolds, Introduction to the European Economic Community: Its History and Its Institutions, 8 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES, Nos. 3/4 1988, at 7, 12-13.

6. The six original Member States were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Subsequently, six other states have joined the Community in
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the product of the European Commission, established in January 1985
under the Presidency of Jacques Delors of France.7 The Commission's
White Paper embodies the project that sets forth the concept of one
large, internal European market and establishes a comprehensive program to achieve that goal. 8 The Community's main purpose is to create
an economic community by establishing a common market that allows
goods, services, and capital to move with ease across national borders.'
Completion of the final steps towards this integration should occur by
the end of 1992. The Commission recently concluded that ninety percent
of the directives that have reached their deadlines have been transposed
into Member States' national law.10
EC law is "a peculiar mix of international and domestic law."' , If
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC
Treaty) provides a legal basis, Community law reigns supreme over national law, and no Member State may enact any statute that deviates or
derogates from EC law.' 2 While this general rule resembles supremacy
clauses of other federal systems, Member State law plays a more vital
role in the framework of EC law than in other systems." Individual

various years: Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1972; Greece in 1979; and
Portugal and Spain in 1984. See EEC TREATY art. 227; Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Single European Act, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 371, 371 (1990). On the
prospects for enlargement of the EC, see John Redmond, The Future Enlargement of
the European Community, 9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 149 (1990).
7. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The "1992 Project": Stages, Structures, Results
and Prospects, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1097, 1098 (1990).

8. The White Paper calls for the adoption of nearly 300 legislative measures by the
end of 1992 aimed at achieiving a common market. These measures have given rise to
slogans like "Project 1992" and "EC 1992." Completing the Internal Market: White
Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (85) final.

9. ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, Environmental Protection Policy 15
(Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1985). Essentially, this requires the creation of a customs
union and the abolition of all restrictions on the movement of the factors of production.
Mark L. Jones, Symposium 1992: Doing Business in the European Internal Market,
Putting "1992" in Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 463, 466 (1989). These goals
also appear in the four freedoms sought under the EEC Treaty: free movement of goods,
persons, services, and capital. EEC TREATY art. 8a.
10. See 689 Common Market Rptr. 1 (Sept. 5, 1991).
11.

Conor Quigley, EC Law: Litigation and the Environment in THE EUROPEAN

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: PRODUCTS LIABILITY RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

288 (Patrick E. Thieffry & G. Marc Whitehead eds., 1990).
12. See generally EEC TREATY art. 5; STEINER, supra note 5, at 30-39 (discussion
of Member States adoption of principle of EC law supremacy); Corta v. ENEL Case 6/
64 (July 15, 1964).
13. See generally Auke Haagsma, The European Community's Environmental Pol-
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Member States may have their own national laws whenever the EC has
not harmonized1 this law at the Community level." More importantly,
even when the EC adopts Community standards, the preference for using directives 6 to establish these laws requires each Member State to
enact legislation to implement these directives. As a result, the vast majority of EC law, including environmental law, will be found in the national law of individual Member States, and these states will have principal responsibility for implementing and enforcing Community
environmental standards.
III.

MAJOR INSTITUTIONS OF THE

EC

The EC legislative process involves the interplay of several political
institutions throughout the drafting and amending processes. Although
each actor plays a specific role, the treaties do not always define these
roles strictly. Even the participants do not always understand the relative
importance of each of these groups. 17 Each institution has its own role in
the legislative structure, and each is important at various stages in the
process.
The major institutions of the EC, which are set out in the EEC
Treaty, are the European Commission (the Commission), the Council of
the European Community (the Council), the European Parliament (the
Parliament), and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ or the court).
Because the EC legislative process involves a close interplay between
these institutions, understanding the institutions and their interaction is
crucial. The new European Environmental Agency (the Agency) additionally may become an important institution in the area of environmental legislation."8

icy: A Case Study in Federalism, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 311 (1989) (discussion of
distribution of powers and governmental functions between the EC and its Member
States in the area of environmental policy).
14. The EC uses the term harmonization to describe the standardization of laws at
the community level. In reality, however, total harmonization is rare under EC law. See
infra note 175.
15. See Haagsma, supra note 13.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 119-26.
17. See generally Reynolds, supra note 5, at 17. Rather than creating separate legislative and executive branches, the EEC Treaty has interwoven these functions in the
institutional framework of the European Commission, Council of Ministers, and the Eu-

ropean Parliament. The judiciary, which is housed in the European Court of Justice, is
the only independent branch. AUDREY WINTER ET AL., EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS:
A LAWYER'S GUIDE 25 (2d ed. 1989).
18. The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is a minor Community institution.
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The European Commission

The European Commission, which is headquartered in Brussels, essentially acts as the executive branch of the EC.' 9 It functions as "the
guardian of the Treaties, [and] the executive arm of the European Communities, to initiate Community policy and to defend Community interest in the Council." 2 The Commission also has responsibility for ensuring "the proper functioning and development of the common market."'"
In addition, the Commission administers the finances of the EC and has
the largest staff of all EC institutions.2 2
The Commission's principal powers and responsibilities include: (i)
proposing legislation; (ii) implementing Community policies; (iii) enforcing the provisions of the EC Treaties; and (iv) drafting and submitting
proposals for new EC rules to the Council. The Commission drafted the
proposals for the Europe 1992 program.2 3
The Commission is composed of seventeen members, or commissioners, 24 appointed to four-year renewable terms by the unanimous consent
of the twelve Member States. 25 These members, though nominated by

It was established by article 193 of the EEC Treaty. The ESC is a 189 member instituion "representing a broad range of professional and labor groups and the general
public." Winter, supra note 17, at 39. Article 193 defines the ESC's role as a purely
advisory one. Article 198 of the EEC Treaty provides that "[t]he Committee must be
consulted by the Council or by the Commission where this Treaty so provides" and that
the ESC may be consulted by these institutions when deemed appropriate. Because the
ESC's powers are purely advisory in nature, it does not have great influence on EC
policy. Gardner, supra note 2, at 21.
19.
LAW

See generally T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS oF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

8-13 (1988).

20. JANET S. ZAGORIN, EUROPE 1992: NAVIGATING NEW WATERS, 4 (1990)
(quoting 1988 Y.B. EUR. COMMUNITIES 157. See WINTER, supra note 17, at 27; see
also EEC TREATY art. 155 ("The Commission shall ... ensure that the provisions of
this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied.").
21.

EEC TREATY art. 155.

22. See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 23. The Commission staff consists of approximately 15,000 "Eurocrats," most of whom are located in Brussels. GARDNER, supra note

2, at 15.
23. Lewis & Goldstein, supra note 3, at 156.
24. In practice, the composition of the Commission is two representatives from
France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain, and one each from the remaining states. See
HARTLEY, supra note 17, at 8. The number of commissioners may be altered by the
Council acting unanimously. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, art. 10(1), 1967 J.O. (152) 1, 5 [hereinafter Merger Treaty]; see GARDNER, supra note 2, at 137-39 (listing current Commissioners, their nationalities, and their current assignments).
25. Merger Treaty, supra note 24, art. 11, at 6.
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each individual Member State, theoretically represent the interests of the
Community as a whole, rather than the interests of individual Member
States.2 6 The Member States, by common accord, appoint a president
and six vice presidents. Each commissioner also receives specific areas
of responsibility, or portfolios, and serves as Directorate General (DG)
for at least one of the Commission's twenty-three major substantive subdivisions.2 8 One commissioner, the Secretariat General,29 has the responsibility for coordinating activities within the entire Commission and acts
as a liaison in the Commission's work with the Council and
Parliament.3"
The Commission plays a key role in the legislative process. It is responsible for proposing virtually all new legislation to the Council of
Ministers.3 ' The DG staff responsible for the appropriate subject area
generally drafts these proposals. The Commission staff typically consults
interested parties, including government officials, private parties, and
trade associations, 2 but no formal process governs this initial consultation. 3 Under the cooperative procedure,3 4 the Commission also has the
opportunity to re-examine proposals following review by the European
Parliament. Finally, the Commission retains the ultimate discretion to
amend or withdraw any proposal under consideration at any time during
the legislative process prior to final passage.35 Notwithstanding its powers of enforcement, the Commission, like the Council, has limited capac-

26. Id. art. 10, at 5. Moreover, commissioners are not to receive instructions from
national governments. See Martin E. Elling, The Emerging European Community: A
Framework for Institutional and Legal Analysis, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 511, 519 (1990).
27. Merger Treaty, supra note 24, art. 14, at 6 (as amended by the Act Concerning
the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic and
the Adjustments to the Treaties, art. 16, 1985 O.J. (L302) 23, 26).
28. WINTER, supra note 17, at 26 (listing 22 of the 23 major substantive subdivisions). Currently, Carlo Ripa Di Meana of Italy is the Vice President in charge of the
environmental portfolio. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 138.
29. Currently, Jacques Delors, the former French Finance Minister, is in his second
term, which expires at the end of 1992, as the Secretariat General. Delors endorses reduced Member State autonomy to achieve adequate environmental protection. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 24.
30. WINTER, supra note 17, at 27.
31. See EEC TREATY art. 155; WINTER, supra note 17, at 28. The Council, however, may request certain proposals that it deems desirable. EEC TREATY art. 152.
32. WINTER, supra note 17, at 42.
33. WINTER, supra note 17, at 44.
34. See discussion infra section (V)(A).
35. WINTER, supra note 17, at 45.
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ity to require compliance with EC law.3 6
One of the Commission's main roles is to serve as a watchdog over the
Member States to ensure their compliance with the EEC Treaty and
Community law. It has the duty to investigate any complaints or suspected violations.3 7 When the Commission determines that a violation
has occurred, it will issue an initial ruling, informally discussing the violation with the offending nation and instructing the Member State on
the corrective action required.38 Should these discussions fail to resolve
the problem, the Commission begins formal review of the situation and
issues a reasoned opinion stating the problem, its conclusions, and the
reasons behind these conclusions. It then sets a time period for compliance.3 9 If the state still fails to comply with the Commission ruling, the
Commission may bring a claim before the ECJ for final determination of
treaty or Community law.4 This entire process may take as long as
eighteen months at the Commission stage and another eighteen to thirty4' Most cases, however, never
six months if brought before the ECJ.
42
reach the stage of reasoned opinions.
B.

The Council

As the main decision-making body of the EC, the Council 43 has the
final vote on all legislation. It adopts, revises, or rejects the Commission's
proposals. The Council has the power both to conclude agreements with
foreign states and, along with the Parliament, to determine the Commu36. See HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 11.
37. EEC TREATY art. 169 (suspected violations) and art. 170 (complaints by other
Member States).
38. ZAGORIN, supra note 20, at 5. The state usually has about two months to comply. Id.
39. EEC TREATY art. 169.

40. Id.
41. Charles M. Ludolph, The European Community's 1992 Legislative and Regulatory Process: Rule-Making to Implementation, in THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: PRODucTs LIABILITY RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 11,
at 19, 26.
42.

Ludolph notes that of the thousand or more infringement proceedings registered

each year, only 40 to 50 result in reasoned opinions, and only a handful appear before
the ECJ. Id. at 26.
43. This is the official name of the Council but it is often referred to as "the Council
of Ministers" or simply as "the Council." See generally HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 1115. The Council is not to be confused with the European Council, which consists of the
EC Member States heads of state and the Commission's president. The European Council's main purpose is to provide policy guidance to other EC institutions. GARDNER,
supra note 2, at 17.
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nity budget. 4 The Council consists of one voting representative from
each Member State.45 Since no individual is designated as the voting
representative, the voting member at any given meeting may vary, depending on the subject under consideration.4 One representative serves
as Council president. 47 The Council operates under its own rules of procedure,4 8 conducts meetings closed to the public, and maintains confidential records.49
Since the Council representatives tend to be high-ranking state ministers or leaders, they only meet infrequently to discuss legislation and
resolve differences. Therefore, the bulk of the work in the legislative process falls upon the Committee of Permanent Representatives (known by
the French acronym, COREPER), ° which represents the Council in
Brussels. COREPER is composed of the twelve Member States permanent ambassadors to the EC.51 This body and various committees consider most of the legislative proposals. Below the COREPER level are
working groups of bureaucrats that are drawn from Member States'
ministers. Because of many high ranking ministers' hectic schedules,
these "Eurocrats" have a great deal of actual power.52 Ministers and
representatives generally establish broad policies and make tough compromises that can only be made at the highest levels.
The EEC Treaty authorizes the Council to act by simple majority,
qualified majority, or by unanimous vote, depending on the nature of the

44. See HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 13-14. On the reasons for, and the nature of,
the joint power of Parliament and the Council over budgetary matters, see Peter Zangi,

The Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Discipline and Improvement of the
Budgetary Procedure, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 675, 675 (1989).
45. Merger Treaty, supra note 24, art. 2, at 4.
46. Each Member State usually has a representative on the Council, namely the
national minister for the topic area under consideration, and for certain high level policy
matters, the heads of state. STEINER, supra note 5, at 10.
47. The role of Council President rotates among the member states for six month
terms. WINTER, supra note 17, at 29. The order of this control is Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Merger Treaty, supra note 24, art. 2, at 4 (as amended by
the Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic and the Adjustments to the Treaties, art. 11, 1985 O.J. (L302) 23, 2425). For the first six months of 1991, the President of the Council is a representative
from Luxembourg. WINTER, supra note 17, at 29.
48. WINTER, supra note 17, at 29 (citing RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COUNCIL
79/868, 1979 O.J. (L 268) 1, modified by 1987 O.J.Eur.Comm. (L 291) 27).
49. Id.
50. STEINER, supra note 5, at 11.
51. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 17.
52. Id.
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matter under consideration. 3 Prior to the enactment of the Single European Act (SEA),5 4 most substantial Council decisions required unanimity. The SEA, however, specifies that only a qualified majority is necessary to legislate in certain vital areas, on issues pertaining to the
completion of the internal market, which can include measures aimed at
the preservation and protection of the environment.56
Despite its power to vote on all EC legislation, the EEC Treaty somewhat limits the powers of the Council. Generally, the Council may only
act on legislative proposals submitted to it by the Commission, although
it has some power to suggest proposals to the Commission.57 The EEC
Treaty requires the Council to consult the European Parliament on all
proposals. 8 This requirement has taken on new importance under the
recent cooperative procedure. 59 Under the old consultation procedure, 60
the Council could virtually ignore Parliament's comments. Parliament
now has significant opportunities to delay passage of legislation through
the Council simply by ignoring it. Furthermore, the the Council's ability
to pass controversial legislation, including environmental legislation, is
limited because many Treaty articles-and all matters of "extreme importance" to any Member State6 -require unanimity to pass. Therefore, the actual Council vote tends to require cooperation and a series of
political compromises. In recent years, however, this limitation has eased
somewhat with the increased use of qualified majority voting and the
increasing dominance of progressive states such as Germany, Denmark,
and the Netherlands on environmental legislation. 62 The ECJ ultimately

53. See WINTER, supra note 17, at 30-31.
54. 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA]. Nine Member States signed the SEA in
Luxembourg on February 17, 1986, and the remaining three signed at the Hague on
February 28, 1986. It became effective on July 1, 1987. The SEA's major goal is to
complete the EC's internal market by December 31, 1992. George A. Bermann, The
Single European Act. A New Constitutionfor the Community?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 529-38 (1989); see also infra section VI(B).
55. "Qualified majority" voting is weighted by state so that the larger states do not
represent a controlling voting block. WINTER, supra note 17, at 30.
56. See SEA art. 100(a); Commission v. Council, Case 300/89 (June 11, 1991).
57. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 22. But see WINTER, supra note 17, at 30 (stating
that the Council "can act only on those proposals that the Commission refers to it").

58.

WINTER,

supra note 17, at 30.

59. See infra section V(A).
60. See infra section V(A).
61. See infra section V(B).
62. David P. Hackett & Elizabeth E. Lewis, European Economic Community: Environmental Requirements in The European Economic Community: Products Liability
Rules and Environmental Policy, supra note 11, at 253, 256.
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has judicial review over all Council's actions.6 3

C. European Parliament
The European Parliament 64 is the only EC institution composed of
directly-elected members.6 5 These Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) are elected roughly in proportion to the size, importance, and

economic power of the Member States. 6 The MEPS elect the head of
Parliament, its President, by secret ballot. 67 Rather than directly representing the interests of any particular nation, MEPs are independent
members, representing one of the nine EC political parties. As representatives of their home district, however, they do represent indirectly the
national interests of their constituencies.6 8 Each MEP serves on one or
more of the eighteen standing committees with portfolios corresponding
to the major EC policy-making areas. 69 Parliamentary activity occurs in
three separate locations: the plenary session meets in Strasbourg, France,
the committees meet in Brussels, and the Secretariat sits in
70
Luxembourg.
The European Parliament is not a parliamentary body in the traditional sense.7 1 Rather, it serves an advisory and supervisory function,
participating in the legislative process at several different points. 2 Vari63. See HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 58.
64. The European Parliament originally was known as the European Assembly. See

R. Beiber et al., Implications of the Single Act for the European Parliament,23 ComMON MKT. L. REv. 767, 770 (1986)
65. Direct elections occurred first in 1979, and these electiofis increased Parliament's"
legitimacy, powers, and influence. STEINER, supra note 5, at 8. The term for each MEP
is five years. WINTER, supra note 17, at 31.
66. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 18. The breakdown of votes per state is as follows:
France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy have 81 representatives each; Spain has 60;
the Netherlands 25; Belgium, Greece, and Portugal have 24 each; Denmark has 16;
Ireland has 16; and Luxembourg has 6. STEINER, supra note 5, at 9.

67.

EEC

68.

STEINER,

TREATY

art. 140.

supra note 5, at 9; Reynolds, supra note 5, at 18. Instead, they re-

present political groups. At present, ten groups of Parliament exist, with the largest being the Socialists, but since agreement requires 260 of the 518 votes, forming political
alliances is generally necessary. See ZAGORIN, supra note 20, at 14; see GARDNER,
supra note 2, at 18.
69. WINTER, supra note 17, at 32. The Committee on the Environment, Public
Health and Consumer Protection considers environmental matters. Id. app. H.
70. This structure has been criticized as highly inefficient. See GARDNER, supra note
2, at 80-81; Elling, supra note 26, at 521.

71.

See

72.

STEINER,

TREATY

GARDNER,

art. 137.

supra note 2, at 18-19.

supra note 5, at 8; Reynolds, supra note 5, at 18-19; see EEC
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ous EEC Treaty provisions require Parliament to be consulted on any
73
legislation proposed in certain areas before enactment by the Council.
When proposed legislation is submitted for Parliament's opinion, it is
referred to the appropriate committee for consideration. That committee
considers the proposal and drafts a report to be presented to the entire
Parliament through the committee rapporteur 4 Parliament then establishes its position on the draft legislation.

The importance of Parliament's comments in the legislative process
has increased substantially since the implementation of the cooperation
procedure for certain legislative proposals. 75 In contrast to the past,
when the Council could virtually ignore Parliament's comments, Parliament now has greater power to block or delay legislation that it opposes.7 8 Under the new procedure, Parliament gets a second reading of
certain draft proposals and may reject proposals, thereby requiring
unanimous Council vote for their passage. It even can submit amendments that, if supported by the Commission, can be defeated only by a
77
unanimous Council vote.
Parliament also possesses other powers that enable it indirectly to influence EC policy. Since the European Commission is accountable directly to Parliament, 8 Parliament has the right to submit written questions to which the Commission must respond." Parliament also has the
power to dismiss the Commission in its entirety and may reject-which
it has done-any annual EC budget proposed by the Commission. 0 Parliament's growing strength can be seen in its initiative and recommendations that led to the drafting of the Single European Act 8 ' and several of
the Commission's proposals for 1992.2 Despite Parliament's influence
and increased participation in decision-making, its exercise of powers

73. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 19.
74.

WINTER,

supra note 17, at 32.

75. See infra section V(A).
76. Although the Council must consider these opinions, still no obligation exists follow them. STEINER, supra note 5, at 8. To pass legislation opposed by Parliament, the
Council must reach unanimous approval. See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 19; infra section V(A).
77. For a detailed description of the new procedure, see WINTER, supra note 17, at
33; Beiber, supra note 64, at 779-86.
78. ZAGORIN, supra note 20, at 4.
79. EEC TREATY art. 140. Parliament also may submit questions to the European
Council, but the Council has no obligation to respond. WINTER, supra note 17, at 33.
80. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 19; Elling, supra note 26, at 521.
81. See Bieber, supra note 63, at 768-69.
82. ZAGORIN, supra note 20, at 4; see also GARDNER, supra note 2, at 81.
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still depends largely on the actions of the Council and the Commission.
D.

3

The European Court of Justice

The fourth EC institution created by the EEC Treaty is the ECJ,
which sits in Luxembourg. s4 This court is comprised of thirteen judges,
one appointed from each Member State and one in rotation from among
the five largest states,"5 who must possess independence of an undisputed
nature.8 6 The judges are appointed for six year renewable terms.8 " Six
advocates general also are appointed, one from each of the four largest
states and two in rotation among the smaller states.88 The advocate's role
is to submit nonbinding, reasoned opinions on matters before the ECJ to
assist the court in interpreting and applying EC law. 9 The ECJ is divided into six chambers that hear specific types of cases, with major cases
heard in plenary session by the entire court. 90
The ECJ has primary jurisdiction over all questions relating to Community law and acts to interpret this law and settle any disputes regarding its interpretation. 91 Claims may be brought before the court by the
Commission, 2 by any Member State,93 or by individuals or firms directly affected by EC laws or rulings.94 While most claims are brought
by the Commission against alleged Member State treaty violators, in recent years claims brought by Member States and individual parties have
increased. These claims have challenged the legitimacy of various acts or
rulings of the Commission or of other EC institutions.9" The court also

83.

See Bieber, supra note 64, at 791.

84. The formal name of the court is the Court of Justice for the European Communities, but it is commonly referred to as the European Court of Justice. See generally
HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 26-63; Carl 0. Lenz, The Court ofJustice of the European
Communities, 14 EUR. L. REV. 127 (1989).
85. WINTER, supra note 17, at 33.

86. EEC

TREATY

art. 167.

87. Id.
88.

89.

90.
91.

supra note 17, at 33.
BEC TREATY art. 166; WINTER, supra note 17, at 33.
EEC TREATY art. 165.
WINTER,

GARDNER,

supra note 2, at 20-21.

92. Id. art. 169.
93. Id. art. 170.

94. Id. art. 173. The effect must be direct on the individual claimant and cannot
merely affect the claimant as a member of a class or group. REHBINDER &

STEWART,

supra note 9, at 147; Quigley, supra note 11, at 294. These individual claims may even
be brought by foreign, or non-member, firms if they feel unfairly penalized by an act of a

Member State or business.
95.

ZAGORIN,

ZAGORIN,

supra note 20, at 6.

supra note 20, at 6. For example, claims have been brought on
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has the power to decide interlocutory requests from national courts regarding EC law and may advise other EC institutions in certain areas.9 6
Reflecting the varied background of the court itself, arguments before
the ECJ generally involve a mix of Community and national law and
consider both civil law and common law precedents.9 7 Although the ECJ
has established a substantial body of case law, 8 it is not formally bound
by precedent, but it tends to rely heavily on it.99 The court's decisions
must be unanimous and, once issued, are final and not subject to
appeal. 0 0

While the ECJ originally was expected to play only a minor role in
shaping EC law, it has played a very activist role in legal interpretation
and has influenced greatly EC law through the judicial review process. 1"1 Despite its power to decide cases and interpret Community law,
the lack of formal mechanisms to enforce compliance with the ECJ's
rulings greatly limits its influence. 0 2 Additionally, the court only has
limited resources with which to hear an increasing backlog of cases.?0 3
As an attempt to mitigate the latter problem, a new court, the Tribunal
of First Instance (the Tribunal), was established to hear certain cases
dealing with specific areas of Community law. Decisions of the Tribunal
are appealable to the ECJ.'0 4 The Tribunal may be a harbinger of fu-

grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the EEC Treaty, or misuse of powers. Quigley, supra note 11, at 294 n.5
(citing EEC TREATY art. 173).
96. EEC TREATY art. 177.
97. ZAGORIN, supra note 20, at 6.
98.

Id.

99. HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 75.
100. ZAGORIN, supra note 20, at 6.
101. See WINTER, supra note 17, at 34; Reynolds, supra note 5, at 24-25. The court
has been described by one commentator as a "secret ally of integration and ... proenvironment." Panel Discussions in, UNDERSTANDING US AND EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 59, 65 (Turner T. Smith, Jr. & Pascale
Kromarek eds., 1989) (statement of Ludwig Kramer).

102. Instead, the court must rely on Community politics and pressure from other
Member States to force compliance. See REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 145;
Reynolds, supra note 5, at 26.
103. See Ami Barav, The Court of FirstInstance of the European Communities, 139
NEW L.J. 1298, 1298 (1989); Jean P. Jacqu6 & Joseph H.H. Weiler, On the Road to

European Union-A New JudicialArchitecture: An Agenda For the Intergovernmental
Conference, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 185, 188 (1990).
104. EEC TREATY art. 168a (as amended 1987). Claims may be brought before this
court in the areas of unfair competition, steel quotas, employment, and staff disputes.
WINTER, supra note 17, at 34; see generally Sir Gordon Slynn, The Court of First

Instance of the European Community, 9 Nw. J.

INT'L

L. & Bus. 542, 544-46 (1989).
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ture specialized courts geared toward relieving the ECJ of its burdensome docket.
E. European Environmental Agency
The most recent entrant in the area of EC environmental law is the
European Environmental Agency (the Agency), which the EC Environment Ministers approved on November 28, 1989."05 This agency, expected to begin operations in 1991, is responsible for "collect[ing] envi-

ronmental data from EEC Member States and disseminat[ing] that
information to interested parties, including governments and private entities." 10 6 Eventually, the Community may expand the Agency's clearinghouse role to include "enforcement activities and development of environmental policies and legislation." 10 1 The Agency also may expand to
include non-Member States throughout Europe, including the Eastern
bloc.'0 8 Details regarding the location and operations of the Agency have
yet to be determined.' 0 9 One commentator has suggested that the formation of this "European-style EPA" indicates that the EC "intends to
play an increasingly active role in the development of environmental policy." ' The creation of the EBA, combined with the effect of the Freedom of Access to Information Directive,"' is likely to enhance information flow and environmental enforcement.
IV. THE
A.

FORM OF

EC

LEGISLATION

Mechanisms for Legislative Action

The EEC Treaty provides several mechanisms for implementing
Community action. EC legislative actions generally take one of three
forms: general rulings, regulations, or directives.112 The legal basis for a
105. Hackett & Lewis, supra note 63, at 257.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Paul S. Luiki & Dale E. Stephenson, EnvrionmentalLaws and Stricter in
'Green'-Influenced Europe, NATIONAL L.J. 45-47 (Sept. 30, 1991).

109. Id. The Council was expected to discuss these issues at their July 1990 meeting, but it did not.
110.

WsNT.R, supra note 17, at 135.

111. This directive will allow private parties to acquire vast amounts of previously
inaccessible environemntal information from public authorities. See Luiki & Stephenson,
supra note 108, at 46. The directive was adopted by the Council in June 1990 and is
required to be implemented by Member States by December 31, 1992.
112. EEC TREATY art. 189. Article 189 also provides for the issuance of recommendations and opinions that have no binding force and are not classified properly as legisla-
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given action and the circumstances surrounding the particular case dictate which means will be utilized.113
General rulings, or decisions, apply to a particular Member State or
individual and only bind the party at which they are aimed." 4 Generally, the European Commission issues these rulings upon discovery of a
violation of the EEC Treaty or a Community law. The Commission also
often uses these rulings to enforce other EC laws." 5
Regulations, on the other hand, are broad, general statements of Community law. They operate essentially like national laws, except that they
apply directly to every Member State and citizen of the EC."' As direct
law, regulations are legally self-sufficient, and compliance may be enforced through actions brought directly before the ECJ. The EC, however, does not favor the use of regulations. The EC usually issues regulations in areas directly governed by Community policies, like agriculture,
antitrust, or antidumping law."' While the EEC Treaty permits the use
of regulations in environmental law, they have rarely been used to address environmental concerns.'"
The EC uses the directive as its principal legislative form in its matters of substance." 9 A directive mandates the achievement of a result to
bind each Member State at which it is addressed. 20 A directive, however, leaves the choice of form and methods of altering the objective to
the national authorities. 2 ' A directive essentially serves as an order for
Member States to enact laws making the directive operative, but leaves
the form of this implementation to the Member States.' 2 This policy
allows flexibility in enacting Community policies to account for the vari-

tion. See Nigel Haigh, Impact of the EEC Environmental Programme: The British Example, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 453, 456 (1989).
113. Winter, supra note 17, at 41.

114. EEC TREATY article 189 states: "A decision shall be binding in its entirety
upon those to whom it is addressed."
115. See STEINER, supra note 5, at 12.
116. EEC TREATY article 189 states: "A regulation shall have general application.

It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States."
117. Quigley, supra note 11, at 292.

118, Haigh, supra note 112, at 456. One notable use of a regulation, however, was a
ban on the import of whale products. Id.
119. On the differences between directives and regulations, see Yves Quintin, Certain InstitutionalAspects of "Europe 1992" and Their Effect on American Companies,
3 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 143, 147-48 (1989).
120. EEC TREATY art. 189.
121. Id.
122. Quigley, supra note 11, at 293.
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ous situations in each Member State.12 While EC directives will be useful for interpreting these national laws,124 the actual standards applied
by each Member State will be determined directly from that nation's
own particular law. 25 Furthermore, as a general rule, EC directives
merely set minimum standards, and Member States are free to adopt
more stringent standards, as long as these standards comply with the
EEC Treaty.' 2 6
This dual nature of directives often causes enforcement problems in

123. Haigh, supra note 112, at 456.
124. Quigley, supra note 11, at 295.
125. One major exception to this rule is the direct effect doctrine for EC directives.
Under this doctrine, individuals have the right to challenge, before a national court, a
Member State's failure to implement Community directives fully or properly. See
Ludoph, supra note 39, at 26. In this case, often after referring the matter to the ECJ
for an interlocutory interpretation of Community law, national courts may enforce EC
directives directly, as if they had been implemented properly under national law. See
REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 37.
Estoppel principles underlie this doctrine. It prevents states from relying on their own
failure to implement EC directives to avoid liability for the violation of individual rights
granted by the directive. Quigley, supra note 11, at 297. See Becker v. Finazamt Miin-

ster Innerstadt, Case 8/81 (Jan. 19, 1982).
The direct effect doctrine applies only when the directive at issue is: (1) sufficiently
clear and precise; (2) unconditional; (3) leaves no room for discretion in its implementation; and (4) of a nature capable of conferring rights on individuals. REBINDER &
STEWART,

supra note 9, at 38; see also John Usher, European Communities, Direct

Effect of Directives: Dotting the i's .... 5 EUR. L. REv. 470, 472-73 (1980). Furthermore, courts may only give direct effect to directives after the time limit for their implementation has passed. STEINER, supra note 5, at 23.
The direct effect doctrine applies only to claims brought against the Member State,
which is also known as vertical direct effect, since directives only bind Member States
and not private individuals. Thus, when directives have not been implemented into national law, injured parties have no recourse for the breach of an EC directive against
another private party, which is also known as horizontal direct effect. REHBINDER &
STEWART, supra note 9, at 38; STEINER, supra note 5, at 26. In actions against private
individuals, directives may only be used indirectly, as a tool for interpreting national law
that implements these policies. See HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 213-14; Jane D.N.

Bates, The Impact of Directives on Statutory Interpretations.Using the Euro-Meaning?,
1986 STATUTE L. REv. 174, 176.
126. See, e.g., EEC TREATY art. 130t (Member States may introduce more stringent
environmental measures than those provided by EC law); id. art. 100a(4) (providing
special Commission procedure to authorize deviation from EC law on the grounds of
"major [state] needs ... relating to protection of the environment"). In no case, however,

may these stricter requirements "constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States." Id. arts. 36, 100a(4). Thus, overly
strict environmental standards may be challenged before the Commission as contrary to

the EEC treaty. See Hackett & Lewis, supra note 62, at 256.
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EC law because implementation gaps sometimes occur between the passage of EC directives and their enactment into state laws. This gap may
be either temporal or substantive. Often, a gap will occur naturally as
the result of procedural limitations and the time required to enact legislation at the national level. A gap, however, may occur intentionally
when a Member State dislikes the directive. The Member State consciously may delay or enact national law inconsistent with the directive's
intent. The effect of such a gap is commonly non-uniform implementa127
tion of EC law, general stalling, and blockage of the directive's effect.

Thus, the problems that the Community sought to avoid through Community legislation often reappear as nonstandard implementation of
Community directives.
Despite continued problems with implementation gaps in the enactment of EC directives, the situation improves as the Community becomes
more sophisticated in legislative drafting and enforcement.' 28 As a result
of this trend, the EC has begun drafting directives with very explicit
requirements for Member State implementation. The new directives

leave Member States so little room for variation in implementation that
they have an effect similar to formal regulations. 29 Furthermore,
amendments to the EEC Treaty have opened the possibility, in certain
cases, of passing EC regulations directly in cases when Member States
have failed to implement directives within the prescribed timetables.' 30
As these techniques improve, the problems of directive implementation
gaps should decrease.
B.

Enforcement of EC Directives

Under the EC system, the main role of implementing and enforcing
the vast majority of EC legislation falls upon the Member States. 3 ' The
Member States are responsible for passing the implementing statutes and
for providing the necessary staff, equipment, and funding to monitor
127. See Ludwig Kramer, The European Economic Community, in UNDERSTANDING US AND EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A PRACTITIONERS GUIDE, supra note
101, at 4, 5. A recent statement of the Commission complained that many Council directives had not been implemented into national law. Quigley, supra note 11, at 297. One
commentator has noted that of 90 internal market directives due to be transposed into
national laws in 1989, only 14 had been adopted by all 12 states. Ludolph, supra note
41, at 25.
128. Ludolph, supra note 41, at 25.
129. See REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 35-36.

130.

WINTER,

supra note 17, at 19 (applying EEC

TREATY

art. 100a).

131. REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 137; see Koenraad Lenaerts, The
Application of Community Law in Belgium, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 253 (1986).
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compliance and to enforce these provisions. 8 2 Generally, the EC's role
in this process is to formulate Community policy and to oversee Member
State compliance with, and enforcement of, these directives.
If a Member State fails to implement a Community directive or otherwise violates the EEC Treaty or laws, the Commission may bring an
action against the Member State to force compliance.'3 If this administrative act of intercession fails to correct the violation, the matter may be
brought before the ECJ for a final ruling. Despite the lack of formal
enforcement mechanisms,"" the EC generally can incorporate directives
into Member States' law.
The EC has been relatively unsuccessful, however, in monitoring
Member State enforcement of these directives once enacted into national
law. Under the dual system of directive legislation, implementing statutes vary considerably from state to state, and each individual state is
responsible to enforce its own law. While the EC has some legal authority to oversee Community law enforcement, it generally lacks the resources and the powers to effect actual enforcement at the national
level.1 " 5 Despite the goal of harmonizing EC law across the entire Community, in reality, Member States largely remain free to enforce EC law
in any manner they see fit.
V.

DEVELOPMENT OF EC LEGISLATION

The EEC Treaty establishes the process by which the EC enacts legislation. The exact procedure used and the roles of various actors in this
procedure depend upon which Treaty article provides the basis for the
legislation. The general procedure, however, is the same for all legislation, environmental or otherwise, and varies only in the specific committees, working groups, and directorates assigned to draft and comment

132.

See

REHBINDER

& STEWART, supra note 9, at 137.

133. For a description of the process involved in bringing this compliance action, see
supra section III(A).

134. The EC is dependent upon public disgrace, political pressure, and the willingness of the states to comply voluntarily with its decisions and rulings. "There are no

federal marshalls in the European Community." Crisp, Current EnvironmentalIssues
in the European Community, 2 (appendix A to McMahon, Europe: 1992 is Almost
Here-Implications for Environmental Aspects of Corporate and Real Estate Transactions, Speech at the American Bar Association Section of Natural Resources, Energy and
Environmental Law, seminar on Practical Implications of International Environmental
Law (Apr. 25-26, 1990)).
135. Of all the infringement proceedings brought by the EC, none have ever been
targeted at Member State enforcement of Community directives. REMINDER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 144.
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upon the particular proposal.
Unlike traditional legislative systems, the EC has established a separate process for each type of legislation, including environmental legislation. This process involves the interplay of the Commission, the Council,
and the Parliament.18 It begins with a proposed draft from the Commission, which is then critiqued and amended based upon comments from
the Parliament before the Council votes finally upon it. This process
generally requires a unanimous vote of all Council representatives to
adopt the legislation. Since the adoption of the SEA, the initial procedure has changed somewhat, providing increased access to the process for
certain Community institutions and permitting the passage of certain
13 7
legislation under a qualified majority vote.
A.

Cooperative and ConsultationProcedures

Originally, the EC enacted legislation under a process known as the
consultation procedure.138 Pursuant to this procedure, the Commission
formulated and submitted proposed regulations or directives for consideration. Commission staff experts generally drafted the proposals after
consulting interested governments and private parties.13 9 This proposed
legislation generally would be published in the Official Journal of the
European Communities as an official Commission document and then
1 40
sent to the Council.
The Council then had to request an opinion on the proposed legislation from the Parliament.1 41 Parliament may have solicited the views of
interested parties in writing or in testimony before the appropriate committee.1 42 The rapporteur of the appropriate committee then drafted an
opinion for the full Parliament to consider. The full Parliament voted to
adopt the final approved opinion or the resolution. Parliament's proposed amendments then could be submitted to the Commission for incorporation. If the Commission refuses to incorporate these amendments,
Parliament had some power to delay consideration of the legislation.1 43
Finally, under the consultation procedure, the Commission submitted

136.
137.
138.
SEA.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

WINTER, supra note 17, at 41.
See infra section V(B).
The consultation procedure still is used today for legislation not covered by the
See supra section H(A).
WINTER, supra note 17, at 42.
Id. If required, the Council also could seek the opinion of the ESC. Id.
Id. at 43.
Id. The ESC's procedure is very similar to Parliament's. Id.
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the bill to the Council, which in turn referred it to a working party
composed of Council representatives and staffed by experts from the various Member States. If the working party approved the proposed legislation, the Council passed it on a fast-track basis, without further debate.
4
Otherwise, the bill went to the Council as a whole for further debate.1
The Commission could have amended or withdrawn any proposal at any
time during the process. As soon as the Council adopted a proposal, it
became law and, if the proposal was a decision or a directive, may have
to have been enacted into national law by Member States.'"
The new cooperative procedure," 6 instituted by the SEA,"4 7 differs
substantially in cases that permit a vote by a qualified majority. In these
cases, Parliament and the Council each have two opportunities, rather
than one, to review Commission proposals. This significantly strengthens
Parliament's role in the legislative process 14 and has made all parties
more aware of the importance of close cooperation during the entire process. 14 Furthermore, the addition of time limits forces compromises to
keep the process moving.'8 0
The cooperation procedure begins exactly like the original consultation process. The Commission submits a proposal to the Council, which
then refers it to Parliament for its opinion.''. Parliament makes a first
reading of the proposal, holds hearings, and formulates its opinion and
comments to send to the Council. The lack of a time limit on the first
reading gives Parliament great freedom to delay the legislative process at
this point. 1 2 After review of Parliament's comments, the Council adopts
no time
a common position by a qualified majority vote.'15 Furthermore,
54
position.'
common
its
issue
to
Council
the
limit exists for
The Council subsequently transmits back to Parliament the common
position, along with an explanation of the reasoning behind this common

144.
145.

See id.
Id.

146. See EEC TREATY art. 149.
147.
148.
149.

SEA, supra note 54, art. 7, at 5.
See Jones, supra note 9, at 473.
See WINTER, supra note 17, at 43.

150. Id.
151.

EEC TREATY art. 149(2)(a).

152. WINTER, supra note 17, at 44.
153. EEC TREATY art. 149(2)(a). If
Commission proposal, then article 149(1)
requirement, however, may be avoided if
self, thus taking advantage of its right to
154. WINTER, supra note 17, at 44.

this common position requires amending the.
of the EEC Treaty requires unanimity. This
the Commission adopts these amendments itamend proposals at any point in the process.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[ol.

24:653

position and the Commission's position, for a second reading. 15 5 Parliament has three months to consider this common position. 151 If Parliament approves or fails to act on the common position proposal the Council must adopt it into law. 57 Otherwise, Parliament has the power to
amend or reject the common position 58 by an absolute majority vote of
its members.' 5 9
If Parliament amends or rejects the common position, it returns the
bill to the Commission, along with any proposed amendments for reexamination.'6 0 The Commission then has one month to consider any
revisions and submit to the Council its re-examined proposal. This reexamined proposal must be accompanied by any Parliamentary amendments not incorporated therein and the reasons for their omission.'
Finally, the Council has three months6 2 to consider the Commission's
re-examined proposal. During this period, the Council may: 1) adopt
this re-examined proposal by a qualified majority vote; 63 2) adopt an
amended version by unanimous approval; 6 4 or 3) fail to act within the
allotted time, in which case the proposal lapses.' 5 During the cooperation process, as well as the consultation process, the Commission retains
the right to alter, amend, or remove any proposal from consideration
prior to its final adoption by the Council.' 6

155. EEC TREATY art. 149(2)(b).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Parliamentary rejection of the common position has the added effect of requiring unanimous consent for Council approval of any subsequent proposal from the Commission. EEC TREATY art. 149(2)(c).

159. The two-thirds majority of votes would be 260 if everyone voted. In practice,
260 votes can represent about two-thirds of the votes actually cast. WINTER, supra note
17, at 45.
160. Id.
161. Id. art. 149(2)(d). Under the one month time limit, the Commission has difficulty discovering the Council's opinion of the proposed amendments and thus their inclusion in the re-examined proposal is unlikely. WINTER, supra note 17, at 45-46.
162. This period may be extended for one month by common accord between the
Council and the Parliament. EEC TREATY art. 149(2)(g).
163. Id. art. 149(2)(e).
164. Id. art. 149(2)(d) (for amendments proposed by Parliament) & (e) (for all other
Council amendments).
165. Id. art. 149(2)(0.
166. Id. art. 149(3). See generally Bieber, supra note 64, at 779-86 (discussing the
steps under the cooperative procedure).
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B.

Unanimity and Qualified Majority Voting

In addition to changing the process for development of EC legislation,
the SEA permits easier passage of legislation enacted under several articles. A great deal of current EC legislation can be passed now by a qualified majority vote of the Council. 67
Under the qualified majority voting system, each Member State receives a number of votes based upon its relative size, importance, and
economic power. England, France, Italy, and Germany each have ten
votes; Spain has eight votes; Belgium, Greece, Portugal, and the Nether-

lands each have five votes; Denmark and Ireland each have three votes;
and Luxembourg has two votes.'" 8 For approval, a qualified majority of
at least fifty-four of the available seventy-six votes must be cast in favor
of a proposal.1'6 This procedure allows the passage of legislation even
when one or more Member States object.' 70 The procedure also has the
potential effect of allowing larger, more industrialized states to outvote
smaller ones because the larger ones have more votes. This problem has
led some environmental organizations to fear potential dilution of envi17 1
ronmental policies.
Even when the Treaty permits the passage of legislation by a qualified
majority vote, special circumstances may lead the Council to impose a
unanimity requirement on its deliberations. The Luxembourg Accord of
1966 serves as precedent for this voluntary constraint. In 1966, to alleviate the domestic concerns of some Member States about being overrun

by Community legislation, 1 2 the EC agreed that on issues of "very important interest" to any Member State, every attempt will be made to
167. Whether the EC uses the qualified voting procedure depends upon the Treaty
article cited as a legal basis for the proposed legislation. See Section VI infra.

168. EEC

TREATY

art. 148(2).

169.

Id.

170.

Originally, the numbers were set up to assure that not more than one major

state-a state with ten votes-could be outvoted under the qualified majority requirements. Now, however, as many as two major states can be outvoted because additional

states have joined the Common Market. See J.A. Usher, The Institutions of the EuroBRACTON L.J. 64, 64-65 (1987).

pean Communities After the Single European Act, 19
171.

See Christian R. Meltzer, Note, The Environmental Policy of the European

Economic Community to Control TransnationalPollution-Time to Make Critical
Choices, 12 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 579, 593 (1990).
172. The EC reached this accord in response to the "empty chair crisis" in the 1960s
when France refused to send a representative to the EC, thus blocking all action requiring unanimous approval, which was essentially everything at that time. In return for this
accord, France agree to send a representative to the European Council. WINTER, supra
note 17, at 7; Reynolds, supra note 5, at 14.
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resolve these interests and reach a unanimous position within a reasonable time.'"' Although this agreement has not been ratified officially or
endorsed, it nonetheless has been understood since that time to require
unanimity on these issues. Whether this accord will remain intact is uncertain as Member States become more accustomed to the use of quali4
fied majority voting in passing Community legislation17
Whether legislation must be passed by qualified majority or unanimous consent is critical because achieving support for any proposal from
all twelve Member States, with their various concerns and situations, is
extremely difficult. Therefore, EC legislation passed by unanimous consent tends to require a great deal of compromises, which ma;y considerably dilute the content of the resulting directive."' This system makes

passing progressive or controversial legislation extremely difficult. While
this problem has been alleviated somewhat with the passage of the SEA,
it is still a significant impediment to progress in the environmental area
and other EC fields.

173. The agreement never explicitly required unanimous approval or explained what
would happen if approval were not reached, but the French delegate issued a statement
at the time that his state understood unanimity to be required. Since that time, this has
been the actual effect of the accord. See WINTER, supra note 17, at 7; Reynolds, supra
note 5, at 14.
174. One commentator has suggested that the SEA provisions permitting qualified
majority voting effectively limited the use of the vital interests unanimity exception.
Ludolph, supra note 41, at 21. Little other indication exists that the Luxembourg Accords have been eliminated in cases of Member States' vital interests. But see Bermann,
supra note 54, at 584-85 (arguing that the SEA does not provide a "hospitable climate
for the Luxembourg Accords").
175. One result of these compromises has been the adoption of various harmonization techniques to permit some flexibility in the standards applied by different Member
States. Some EEC environmental policy measures may require total harmonization,
under which identical rules will apply throughout all Member States, although this is
rare. Generally, Community environmental law requires optional harmonization, under
which all products meeting community standards must be permitted access to the market
of each Member State, although a nation may set separate-generally more liberal-standards for its own domestic market. Another strategy is alternative harmonization, by which more than one strategy for environmental protection is established, and
each Member State may choose the one that best suits its environmental needs. See generally REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 207-12 (discussing the various types of
harmonization techniques).
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VI.

THE HISTORY OF THE LEGAL GROUNDING FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION IN THE EC

Although the EC's main goals are economic, environmental protection
has taken on great importance at the Community level in recent years.
This trend reflects a growing recognition that environmental problems
are of a transnational nature and that certain environmental issues can
best be dealt with on a multinational level by organizations like the
EC.176 On these premises, the EC has enacted a substantial body of environmental law in areas such as air, water, waste, toxic substances, and

noise pollution, 1 which solidifies the EC's role in formulating and im178
plementing environmental policy.
A. Early Environmental Legislation
The EC first began to formulate an environmental policy in 1973
when the European Council approved the EC's First Environmental Action Program (EAP).' 7 This program expressed the need for a Community-based environmental policy to "improve the setting and quality of
life, and the surroundings and living conditions of the peoples of the
Community" and proposed a number of remedial actions and directives.180 The First EAP expired in 1978, but has since been followed by
the Second, Third, and Fourth EAPs. 8 ' Each succeeding program has
been more developed and complex than its predecessors, as the emphasis
of Community environmental policy has shifted from remedying existing
environmental problems to preventing future problems actively. Under
EC has assumed a more important role in
each successive program, the
82
environmental protection.1
Although few challenged the EC's capacity to legislate on environmental matters, 83 the actual legal basis for environmental legislation re176. See Hahn & Richards, supra note 4, at 421; Bryan Harris, EEC Laws on
Environmental Protection, 137 NEw L.J. 1058, 1059 (1987).

177. See Diana Good, 1992 and the U.S. ManufacturingIndustry: Harmonization
of Product Standards, Product Liability and Environmental Law in 1992 THE
CHANGING LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE

11, 49-62 (Walter W.

Oberret ed., 1989); Hackett & Lewis, supra note 62, at 256.

178. See infra Sections VI(A) & (B).
179. 1973 O.J. (C 112) 1, 3.
180.
181.
1983 to
182.
183.
the EC

Id. at 5.
The Second EAP was effective from 1978 to 1982, the Third EAP covered
1987, and the Fourth EAP, currently in effect, extends from 1987 to 1992.
See Good, supra note 177, at 43-48; Meltzer, supra note 171, at 588-90.
The only real debate existed at the academic level. In practice, the capacity of
to legislate on environmental matters has been continuously supported by the
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mained uncertain until the passage of the SEA in 1986."8 The original
EEC Treaty contains no references to the environment and presents no
explicit basis for the formulation of environmental law. 1 5 Therefore,
early environmental law had to be linked indirectly to the generallyworded economic bases set forth in articles 100 and 235 of the EEC
Treaty." 6
Article 100 permits the European Council to issue any directive required for the harmonization of Member State law to permit the proper
functioning of the Common Market. 18 7 Pursuant to this article, the EC
passed environmental statutes passed to harmonize Member States environmental laws, on the theory that divergent environmental standards
might create trade barriers, stifle competition, and thus impair the func-

tioning of the Common Market. 88 Some commentators originally viewed
environmental law as a means to create a level playing field across
Member States with only secondary benefits for environmental protection. This solely economic rationale behind article 100 limited its useful18 9
ness as a basis for environmental legislation.
Even when environmental legislation could not be justified on economic or harmonization grounds, a catch-all provision in article 235 allowed the passage of certain environmental directives. Article 235 grants
the Council broad powers to enact any measure "necessary to attain, in

ECJ's decisions and by the statements and practices of the various Community institutions. Since all early environmental legislation was passed by the unanimous consent of
all Member States, these laws have rarely been challenged by any state or party. See
Dirk Vandermeersch, The Single European Act and the Environmental Policy of the
European Economic Community, 12 EURO. L. REv. 407, 409-10 (1987).
184. The Single European Act ended this legal basis debate in 1987 by adding a new
title to the EEC Treaty explicitly providing for environmental legislation under the
Treaty. See infra Section VI(B).
185. REHMINDER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 15.
186. See Haagsma, supra note 12, at 319-23; REHMINDER & STEWART, supra note
9, at 16; Vandermeersch, supra note 183, at 409-12.
187. In relevant part, article 100 provides: "The Council shall, acting unanimously
on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market." EEC TREATY art. 100.
188. See WINTER, supra note 17, at 136; Harris, supra note 177, at 1059. Origi-

nally, the article 100 requirement of harmonization based on existing law in the Member
States was a limiting factor, preventing the EC from initiating legislation not previously
existing at a national level. Over time, however, the EC adopted numerous environmental standards that did not previously exist in local Member State law.
189. REHINDER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 21. At times, the official economic
basis for these measures was tenuous at best. See Vandermeersch, supra note 183, at
410-11.
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the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives
of the Community," whenever the EEC Treaty fails to provide the necessary powers. 190 Still, this required some link with the common market,
and the Community found it difficult to justify environmental policy devoid of any economic or market effect.' 9 ' Thus, practical application of
article 235 as the sole basis for environmental directives was
uncommon.

1 92

Despite the debate over the legitimacy of environmental directives
under articles 100 and 235 and the need to link early environmental
legislation with economic policy, the barriers to EC environmental policy
collapsed over time. By the mid-1980s, the Council had virtually unlim93
ited power to implement any environmental directive that it approved.'
The passage of the SEA eliminated remaining doubts regarding the EC's
authority to pass environmental legislation.
B.

Effects of the Single European Act

94
The SEA, passed in 1986 as an amendment to the EEC Treaty,1
enlarged the Treaty's scope and introduced a number of changes

190.

Article 235 of the EEC Treaty reads in whole:

If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European
Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
EEC TREATY art. 235.
191. Vandermeersch, supra note 183, at 411. Also, legislation under this article
meant that environmental issues would have to be an objective of the EC, which was
difficult to justify originally when no economic link existed. Owen Lomas, Environmental Protection,Economic Conflict and the European Community, 33 McGILL L.J. 506,

511 (1988).
REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 9, at 28.
193. Vandermeersch, supra note 183, at 408. This was especially true since all environmental legislation under these articles had to be passed by unanimous vote. While this
unanimity requirement effectively made it unnecessary for any Member State to challenge any approved measure, Donald L. Morgan, EEC Environmental Policy and the

192.

Free Movement of Goods: The Significance of the Legal Basis for EnvironmentalMeasures in THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: PRODUCTS LIABILITY RULES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 11, at 299, 302, it also effectively blocked the
passage of any controversial or progressive environmental policy.
194. 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. The SEA is the first and only amendment ever made to
the EEC Treaty. It became effective on July 1, 1987. See generally Nicholas Forwood &
Mark Clough, The Single European Act and Free Market, 11 EUR. L. REV. 38 (1986)
(discussing the impact of the SEA on the EEC).
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"designed to further the cause of European integration."'," Of particular
importance in the environmental area was the addition of Title VII to
the EEC Treaty,' 9 which explicitly articulates and defines the goals of
the Community to include protection of the environment and improvement of the quality of life for the people of the Community.' 97 Additionally, the SEA amended the legislative process for environmental laws to
permit easier passage in certain cases.19 8 Some commentators, however,
have noted that while the SEA opens the door to EC legislation specifically directed at protecting the environment, it may have a limiting effect
on environmental legislation over time because it defines otherwise undefined boundaries and provides additional bases for procedural challenges
to environmental legislation. 99
Article 130r of Title VII begins by broadly defining the environmental
objectives of the Community. These objectives include: 1) the preservation, protection, and improvement of the quality of the environment; 2)
the protection of human health; and 3) the prudent and rational utilization of natural resources.2 00 Article 130r(4) also directly authorizes the
Community to take environmental action whenever these goals can be
better attained at the Community level than at the level of the individual
Member States.20 ' Furthermore, article 130r defines the basic principles
on which Community environmental action should be based: 1) "that
preventive action should be taken"; 2) "that environmental damage
should as a priority be rectified at the source"; and 3) "that the polluter

should pay."2' 2 Finally, article 1301 lists the factors which the Commu-

195. STEINER, supra note 5, at 4.
196. SEA Article 25 added Title VII.
197. WINTER, supra note 17, at 136-37. For a view that this expansion should not
come as a surprise, see Michel Waelbroeck, The Role of the Court of Justice in the
Implementation of the European Act, 11 MICH. J.

INT'L

L. 671, 687 (1990).

198. This easier process, which involves qualified majority voting on certain directives, see supra section V(A), actually is found outside of article VII in section 100a of
the EEC Treaty.
199. See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
200. EEC TREATY art. 130r(1). As to the scope of these objectives, see
Vandermeersch, supra note 183, at 413-14.
201. EEC TREATY, art. 130r(4). This is known as the Subsidiarity Principle. See
Vandermeersch, supra note 183, at 422-23; Meltzer, supra note 171, at 595-96. For a
more general discussion of the subsidiary principle in EC debate, see Editorial Comment,
The Subsidiary Principle, 27

COMMON MKT.

L.

REV.

181 (1990).

202. EEC TREATY art. 130r(2). This third principle, "that the polluter should pay,"
differs significantly from the United States practice that all parties related to the environmental problem, including third party purchasers, facility operators, and landowners on
toxic waste sites, may be held responsible. WINTER, supra note 17, at 136 n.5.
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nity must consider in developing environmental policy including: (1)
"available scientific and technical data;" (2) "environmental conditions
in the various regions of the Community;" (3) "the potential benefits and
costs of action or lack of action;" and (4) "the economic and social development of the Community as a whole and the balanced development of
its regions."2 0 3
The other two articles that make up Title VII, articles 130s and 130t,
set forth the explicit legislative basis for Community environmental
law20 4 and establish the Member States' freedom to maintain or intro-

duce more stringent environmental measures than those adopted by the
as a whole, as long as they remain compatible with the EEC
Community
20 5
Treaty.
Article 130r(2), which requires that environmental considerations be
made a component of all Community legislation, regardless of the area
involved, may be even more important than the articles providing an
explicit legal basis for environmental legislation.2 0 This integration
principle broadens the scope of environmental policy by making it a pervasive factor in all Community legislation.
The SEA also allows the Community to pass environmental legislation
by a qualified majority vote,20 7 using the cooperation procedure 208 set
forth in article 100a. This article pertains to measures designed for approximation of Member State laws, regulations, and administrative actions that have the object of establishing or affecting the functioning of

203. EEC TREATY art. 130r(3).
204. Article 130s of the EEC Treaty provides:
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee,
shall decide what action is to be taken by the Community.
The Council shall, under the conditions laid down in the preceding subparagraph, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified
majority.
Id. art. 130s.
Unless the Council explicitly finds that a decision in this area is to be passed by qualified majority vote, this article establishes the traditional consultation procedure, see

supra, section V(A), and requires unanimous consent for any environmental legislation
passed.
205.

Article 130t of the EEC Treaty states "[t]he protective measures adopted in

common pursuant to Article 130s shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining

or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with this Treaty." EEC
TREATY art. 130t.

206. Id. art. 130r(2).

207. See supra section V(A).

208. See supra section V(A).
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the internal market.2"' While the main goal of article 100a is to promote
legislation that enhances "the establishment and functioning of the internal market," subparagraph 3 explicitly notes that environmental legislation may be based upon this article as well. 210 This section not only
suggests this possibility, but specifically provides that the EC must "take
as its base a high level of protection." 2 1 ' The extent to which environmental legislation may be based on article 100a, as opposed to the more
direct basis found in article 130s, however, remains unclear.2" 2 If the
ECJ approves the use of article 100a for environmental legislation, many
commentators predict a vast increase in the use of qualified majority vot23
ing in this area appears likely.
The ECJ's ruling is especially significant in that despite the obvious

advantage of providing explicit justification for the EC's environmental
policy, the SEA may have actually limited the Community's capacity to
legislate in this area. The guidelines and procedural requirements prescribed in article 130r(3) may open the door for legal challenges to Community environmental legislation for failure to follow these procedural
requirements and policy principles.21 4 Furthermore, although the subsidiarity principle of article 130r(4) grants the EC authority to legislate
when environmental objectives "can be attained better at the Community
level," it expressly reserves residual jurisdiction to the Member States. 21 5

209. Article 100a(1) provides:
By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise provided in this
Treaty.... [t]he Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission in cooperation with the European Parliament ...adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
210. This section states "[t]he Commission, in its proposals envisaged [under this
article] concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer protection, will
take as its base level a high level of protection." EEC TREATY art. 100a(3).
211. EEC TREATY art. 100a(3). Nowhere does the Treaty define the term "a high
level of protection." See Vandermeersch, supra note 183, at 417.
212. See Leigh Hancher, Energy and the Environment: Striking A Balance, 26
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 475, 498-02 (1989).
213. See Morgan, supra note 193, at 316. This ruling makes the passage of these
directives easier and may effectively end the use of article 130s. Id.

214, Under article 130r(3), the EC must, in preparing action relating to the environment, take account of available scientific and technical data, environmental conditions in
various regions of the Community, the potential benefits or costs of action or lack of
action, the economic and social development of the Community as a whole, and the balanced development of its regions. EEC TREATY art. 130r(3).
215. Meltzer, supra note 171, at 592. At least one author has declared that this
residual jurisdiction is a step back compared to prior environmental policy. See

19911
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While prior legislative acts could be justified as required to enforce trade
standards among Member States, new legislation based on article 130(5)
must comply with the policies and processes set out therein. In certain
cases, this means that those seeking to challenge the drafting procedure
of this legislation will have stronger grounds for attack of environmental
legislation under article 130(5).216

VII.

POINTS OF INFLUENCE

As the foregoing description of the EC legislative process indicates,
interested parties have numerous opportunities to influence the legislative process and create favorable legislation. In accordance with the cooperative procedure established by the SEA, legislative proposals generally
receive a great deal of discussion. Therefore, to "keep an eye on proposals as they work their way back and forth in the institutions often being
discussed at different levels, by different individuals and different degrees
of detail at the same time" becomes important217 Because legislative
meetings are often closed to the public and working drafts can be diffiways to keep up to speed is to
cult to obtain, one of the most effective
21 s
befriend an appropriate "Eurocrat.

Since the EC legislative process is dynamic, a proposal may be under
simultaneous consideration by two or more institutions at any given time.
Thus, interested parties may have to work with two separate proposals:
(1) the official text proposed by the Commission and subject to the formal process set forth in the EEC Treaty; and (2) the unofficial text
under consideration by the Council that, although lacking official status,
has a strong impact on the Council's ultimate decisions. 219 Therefore,
simultaneoulsy coordinating lobbying efforts and considering the relevant
220
institutions to approach is important.

Vandermeersch, supra note 183, at 422.

216. In the past, challenges to environmental legislation were limited basically to
challenging the legal basis for Community action. In contrast, under the SEA, injured
parties may challenge legislation as: (1) violating the principle of subsidiarity of article
130r(4); (2) failing to make the assessments required by article 130r(3); and (3) not

abiding by the basic principles of article 130r(2). Steiner, supra note 5, at 7;
Vandermeersch, supra note 183, at 428.
217. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 101 (quoting Paul Adamson, an EC parliamentary
consultant); Ludolph, supra note 41, at 22. John Gardner's book, Effective Lobbying in
the European Community (cited supra note 2) is an excellent recent book on lobbying in
the EC.
218. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 64.
219.
220.

Ludolph, supra note 41, at 24.
GARDNER, supra note 2, at 100; WINTER, supra note 17, at 52.
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The Commission, with its power to draft legislation and to endorse
Parliament's amendments for Council approval, has been described by
several commentators as the main branch to target in order to track and
influence EC legislation. 2 ' Primary responsibility for legislative proposals generally is assigned to the particular directorate for that subject
area.222 Interested parties should determine which DG of the Commission has jurisdiction over a given piece of legislation and become acquainted with the responsible commissioner and the chef de cabinet, or
chief of staff.22 3 Although appointments can be made to speak with the

officials in person, letters or briefs addressed to the chef de cabinet may
represent a more effective method of introducing a particular concern.2 24
Also, the civil servant administrative staff might serve as a useful source
of information and advice.225 If the Commission has formed a working
group on a particular proposal, determining its membership and targeting the members from states with sympathetic interests will be useful.2 26
Furthermore, all commissioners have the power to veto proposals, regardless of their area of specialty.2 27
To influence the legislative process, interested parties should get an
early input into the Commission to ensure that the text of the initial
proposed draft legislation reflects their position favorably. 22 s At the initial stage, the Commission actively seeks the views of parties likely to be
affected.229 Contact with the Commission also enables interested parties
to influence the Commission's willingness to incorporate amendments
proposed by Parliament. 23 ° Finally, interested parties may be able to assess the willingness of the Commission to accept text changes proposed
by Member States. If the Commission endorses these changes, a proposal
stands a better chance of adoption under the qualified majority voting

221. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 2, at 69; Ludolph, supra note 41, at 22-24;
Quintin, supra note 119, at 149.
222. In the case of environmental policy, this DG is Directorate XI, who covers the
areas of the environment, nuclear safety, and civil protection.
223. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 70; WINTER, supra note 17, at 52.
224. WINTER, supra note 16, at 52-53. Making appointments with key Commission
officials can be very difficult due to their heavy workloads. See GARDNER, supra note 2,

at xix.
225. WINTER, supra note 17, at 53.
226. Id.

227. Id. This may be useful if a veto is a party's ultimate goal, and the party can
convince
228.
229.
230.

one commissioner of the strength of its position. Id.
Ludolph, supra note 41, at 22; GARDNER, supra note 2, at 65-66.
WINTER, supra note 17, at 53.
See Ludolph, supra note 41, at 24.
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procedure. 2"'
Maintaining contact with the Council, which has the final say on all
legislation also is important for interested parties. Parties must monitor
the progress of legislation through the working groups.2" 2 The confidential nature of the Council's proceedings, however, may make it the most
difficult institution to influence directly. 2m A less direct alternative may
involve approaching selected Member State governments or authorities
and trying to persuade them to adopt a particular position at some or all
levels of Council consideration. 3 4 This indirect contact may occur in
Brussels or in the Member States' capitals.2 5 The contact may be effective if a Member State can be convinced that a proposed EC action will
adversely affect one or more of its constituents.23 6
Although the Parliament lacks the Commission's or Council's influence over legislation, it represents a pertinent point of access to the legislative process. Parliament must be consulted during the drafting process
of all new legislation, and it has the power to delay or impose other
restraints on the legislative body. 237 Parliament's overall influence, however, will be determined by the Commission's and the Council's willingness to accept its proposals. Thus, interested parties must work to influence Parliament's efforts in a manner that considers the deliberations of
the Council. This will ensure that Parliament's views will be acceptable
to, and incorporated by, the Council. 231 In addition, if Parliament

achieves a broad Community consensus through its committees and their
respective rapporteurs,the Council and Commission will be reluctant to
ignore this position. 3 9 Furthermore, Parliament may be persuaded to
2 40
use its budgetary power to advance or block legislative proposals.
The current Parliament may be more receptive to environmentalist
causes than its predecessors. In the 1989 elections, the Green Party won
231. Id.
232. Id. Extensive informal consideration of legislative proposals often occurs prior
to the Commission's official unveiling of them. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 76.

233.
234.

WINTER,

supra note 17, at 53.
supra note 2, at 75;

GARDNER,

WINTER,

supra note 17, at 53. This could
WINTER, supra note 17,

include the working group, COREPER, or the Council itself.
at 53.

235.

WINTER,

supra note 16, at 53.

236. Id.
237. See supra section III(C).
238. See Ludolph, supra note 41, at 24. Influencing Parliament can be difficult because many of its important meetings are dosed to the public. Here, as elsewhere, reliable inside sources are crucial to successful lobbying. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 64.
239. WINwrER, supra note 17, at 53-54.
240. Id. at 54.
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significant victories. 2 1' The Green momentum is causing the more mainstream parties, such as the Socialists, to align themselves with Green
causes.

242

Maintaining contact with the quasi-official bodies of the EC such as
the European Environmental Bureau, which represents environmental
quality interests and private-sector environmental groups, may also be
useful for an interested party. 243 The Commission publishes a register
that lists Community-wide interest groups consulted by the Commission
on a regular basis. 244 Working with these groups represents an effective
2 45
way to track EC developments and to influence proposals.

Finally, the United States government might be a useful contact. Concerned that EC developments will create an economic "Fortress Europe," the United States government has taken an active role in monitoring and attempting to influence Community developments.24 6
Congressional committees and other groups with direct interests in Community developments are particularly useful resources.247
If all else fails, influencing the implementation and enforcement of
environmental directives at the Member States level may be possible
once the directives have been adopted. 248 Although the Commission has

significant power to require the implementation of directives by each

241. GARDNER, supra note 2, at 82, 88.
242. The Socialist Party has reportedly "placed environmental protection on its
'short' list of priority issues." Id. at 88.
243. WINTER, supra note 17, at 52, 54.
244. Id. at 54. This publication, The Directory of ProfessionalOrganizationsBefore
the European Community, is available at the EEC offices in the United States and elsewhere or may be purchased from the EC sales agent Unipub at (301) 459-7666. The
following is a brief list of important groups and the interests that they represent: Union
of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) (labor interests); the
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (labor interests); the European Bureau
of Consumers Union (BEUC) (consumer interests); the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) (business interests) and the Conseil Europ~en des Fedrations de
L'Industrie Chimique (CEFIC) (European chemical industry interests). See GARDNER,
supra note 2, at 39-57.
245. WINTER, supra note 17, at 55.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 56 (listifig congressional committees and agencies with'a direct interest in
the Communities 1992 program). These entities include the White House Economic Policy Committee, the Trade Policy Subcommittee of the United States Trade Representative 1992 Taskforce-of which one working group deals specifically with health and
environmental issues-the Department of Commerce Office of European Community Affairs, the Department of State and its official United States Mission to the EC in Brussels, and the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees. Id. at 57-58.
248. See GARDNER, supra note 2, at 101-02; Quintin, supra note 119, at 150-51.
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Member State, leeway still exists to influence the content of the implementing regulations adopted by each Member State. Therefore, in areas
that remain ambiguous after the adoption of a directive, Member States
will have latitude to choose how best to implement the directive. Moreover, a point of access in the enforcement area might exist because some
Member States are less concerned about the strict enforcement of certain
regulations. In a given case, the limitation of a directive's impact on an
individual corporation operating in a particular Member State may be
possible. This level of last resort remains largely free from oversight by
the Commission, which lacks both the resources and the authority necessary to attack lax enforcement of environmental directives.2 49
Finally, when seeking to affect the legislative process at any point,
United States enterprises should not expect to be given the same reception accorded to their European counterparts.250 Seeking alliances with
similarly interested EC companies, Community-based trade groups, and
industry federations can help avoid this problem.2 51 A company also can
seek to have its views presented through the United States government.252 The more European the view presented, however, the more acceptable it will be to the parties listening.25 3 Whenever possible, comments should emphasize existing national or Community policies
expressing similar concerns or should stress the consonance of the views
presented with the objectives of the internal market program. 2

4

This is

especially true when going before the Commission, which functions to

2 55
represent the interests of the Community as a whole.
Foreign companies must recognize that lobbying is a relatively new
feature of the EC legislative process and only now is becoming accepted. 25' The lobbying process undoubtedly will evolve and become
more standardized as the Community begins to function as a whole.

249. Possibly, the Commission can force compliance with a directive under the direct
effect concept, as opposed to requiring implementation at the national level. This, however, is not common. See supra note 114.
250. WINrER, supra note 17, at 51.
251. Id. at 53.
252. Id. at 51.
253. Ludolph, supra note 41, at 22.
254. Id.
255. See WiNTRE, supra note 17, at 53.
256. Many Europeans will deny, however, that lobbying of the EC takes place in
Brussels or the Member State capitals. GARDNER, supra note 2, at xv. The reason for
the more recent recognition of lobbying is that, as new legislation is adopted, firms, and
corporations throughout the community are affected by the sweeping changes being instituted. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Prerequisite to working with the environmental regulatory structure of
the European Community is a knowledge of the process, players, and
practical political realities that make up the legislative and enforcement
apparatus. As in any political system, the legislation process for environmental laws involves myriad parties with different, overlapping, and
conflicting agendas. The peculiar blend of federalism and national sovereignty in the EC renders the Community legislative process even more
challenging. As the Community attempts to weave a uniform body of
environmental laws and regulations for disparate peoples with unique
situations, circumstances, and philosophies, the political process will
grow in importance. Learning the Community legal structure is the first
step toward securing a platform from which to participate in the legislative process as it shapes the environmental face of Europe. Becoming an
effective participant in the EC regulatory arena requires familiarity with
the anatomy of the rulemaking system before mastering the political subtleties and gaining access to the organs of power within the EC legislative establishment.

